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Is 5G even possible in Australia?

Discussion in 'Networking, Telephony & Internet' started by blondie_hunter, Aug 19, 2019.

  1. flu!d

    flu!d Never perfect, always genuine

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    And in the 1990's the LNP 'mainstreamed' mental health services in Victoria (stated due to the fact I live in Victoria) by closing psychiatric institutions. It's always the right wing, the party that has such a massive problem with spending taxes on the people as opposed to simply making the top 3% wealthier.

    You've been duped.

    I've looked up terrorist activities in the past in an attempt to educate myself as opposed to listening to the mind numbing shit spoon fed by mainstream media, am I a terrorist? I'm sure Dutton knows if I am whether I use a VPN or not.
     
    Last edited: Aug 20, 2019
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  2. Sunder

    Sunder Member

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    I'm sure that post makes sense to you... But you've lost me. Not all that interested in politics in this thread. I'm sure you've labelled me a right winger already, which is odd, as take the ultimate right wing, and you get libertarianism, virtually no government interference, and take it extreme left, and you get communists states, which seem rather intent on breaching privacy. Oh well.

    So. 5G. Fun times ahead, right? Think peer to peer, low latency connections, along with high bandwidth to remote servers. Cars that can talk to each other to avoid collisions with sub millisecond latency. Delivery drones (in actuality disguised AFP drones, to make Flu!d happy), that can determine that you're currently not home, and deliver your package to you, as you drive. Think no concept of "syncing" devices, with 20Gbit peer to peer, your phone is your computer, and your computer is your phone.
     
  3. Xepper_Pepper

    Xepper_Pepper New Member

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    But I just wanna upload higher res cat pics.
     
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  4. elvis

    elvis Old school old fool

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    I'm way off topic here (I don't think I've said much about 5G in 2 pages), so if this is boring folks, speak up, and I'll shut up. But until then....

    What Dutton wanted, in his ignorance, was a "good guys only" decryption tool to get at plaintext information between two parties under investigation. When the collective international mathematics experts of the world told him he was being a complete drop kick, he instead went for the device, demanding that he could strongarm any manufacturer into giving his department unfettered access to a device (even to the point of silently side-loading code, apps and reporting tools), bypassing the encryption part of device-to-device messaging and accessing information at the point of input. (His initial request was even more ominous, in which the government could demand an individual working for an organisation plant the code, and would be fined up to $5000 if they spoke to anyone else about it - too bad if your code review, QA and CI processes picked up the code, and you were questioned, and your job threatened).

    Yes, it's technically incorrect to call these "encryption backdoors". What they are, outright, are legally sanctioned device exploits.

    And here's the problem - we're no longer in a physically restricted world. Back in the "good old days" when documents were kept in safes and we called each other on the copper-line POTS telephone, if the police rightfully requested access (via a warrant, enacted by a safe cracker or phone tap) and got a hold of their evidence, it didn't leave the individual open to attack from literally the entire world. The police got their evidence, locked it up safe and sound, and either continued with the investigation or dropped it. If it turned out you didn't do anything wrong - no harm, no foul. You weren't left with your arse hanging in the wind.

    Today's problem is bigger than just "the good guys". We see all the time examples of backdoors used by "the good guys" which then are exploited by "the bad guys". EternalBlue is the modern example, but there are countless others. Exploits intended to initially help the good guys fight the bad guys, that just end up costing billions in damage every year to innocent private citizens caught in the digital cross fire.

    Say Dutton gets his wish, and can force Apple or Samsung or Microsoft or anyone else to side load code silently on to phones and computers that are capable of extracting ANYTHING from the phone direct from the input, prior to any sort of encryption, obfuscation or privacy measures. What then? "The good guys" get a win, and put some bad people away. Super. But what happens if (and more likely when) that same technology leaks or is discovered by a third party, and it's now in the hands of every single human on planet Earth? What then? Was it worth it in the bigger picture?

    This latter part is the problem many, many people are rightfully having with the concept. This isn't tin-foil hat bullshit. We've seen this happen over and over again in the real world. It's not obvious, and it's not clear cut. It still needs a lot of discussion.

    Secondarily to that is abuse of process. The "300K requests to metadata" have nothing to do with back doors or encryption. And, perhaps, all 300K requests to metadata were 100% legitimate in need. But 300K seems like an awfully large number. Maybe I'm clueless, and maybe there are really that many bad people floating around doing bad shit often enough that all 1000+ requests per business day were absolutely necessary. If we were a population the size of the USA, I'd probably think that was OK. But we're not. And that number honestly seems too high. And yeah, I'm throwing a lot of assumptions around, but I can only assume that between 2015 and now, that number is climbing year on year (given political climates and new laws coming in to place). I'm not clueless into thinking that modern day "wire taps" aren't necessary - bad people exist, and need to be stopped. I am also very pro-Police, with many friends who serve, so I know a little about the bullshit they have to deal with day to day. But I truly question if the checks and balances I'm assured of as a voting citizen are actually being followed as promised, or if sometimes people are just taking the piss.
     
    Last edited: Aug 20, 2019
  5. JSmithDTV

    JSmithDTV Member

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    Can 5G handle 8K pr0n 24/7? :Pirate:


    JSmith
     
  6. cvidler

    cvidler Member

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    Cheaper, sure (initial purchase price), long term running costs? no.
    Better. No.

    One of the other downsides to Huawei's numerous security problems, is their higher power consumption.

    So the long term cost of the Huawei 5G gear is going to be more. 5G itself is more power hungry (more cells required, and more equipment to run each cell) than 4G and 3G, so you don't want to be putting in less efficient gear as well.

    No one is xenophobic here. There's plenty of hard evidence, all summing up to the fact the Huawei option for the 5G network is a very poor choice for many reasons.

    Whether the numerous documented security holes are backdoors or just poor engineering practices, either way. No thanks.

    Not JSmith
     
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  7. elvis

    elvis Old school old fool

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    The UK porn industry backed the tech that is current 4G pretty hard (*giggle*) when it first was announced.

    Porn pretty much decided the fate of VHS/Betamax and BluRay/HD-DVD too. Never discount the porn industry's... ahem... pull... on technology directions.
     
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  8. JSmithDTV

    JSmithDTV Member

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    Sure, that is why Germany, Spain and other Euro nations are going to use Huawei... gotcha. ;)

    No the Australian Governments policy on this issue is however... IMO.


    JSmith
     
  9. BAK

    BAK RIP

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    As the great leader himself said, the laws of Australia, not the laws of mathematics, take primacy here.

    It is something of a quandry, because on the one side you have the fact that hey, there will be situations when law enforcement needs to gain access to stuff. On the other side you have the fact that hey, we should be able to protect our shit from unlawful access. Personally, I fundamentally disagree with the "weakening" of security or making devices exploitable. The fact that our government seems to be leading the (5eyes/western) way in allowing for the introduction of such exploits is tremendously disheartening.
     
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  10. Sunder

    Sunder Member

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    Firstly, thanks for taking the time to think this through. It's rare in this discussion to actually get an informed opposition.

    You are correct that the legislation in itself does not protect against your concern that if nothing was found, there is no further exposure, at least not directly. However, comparing it against EternalBlue is a false comparison - In that case, the vulnerability already existed, and the security agency developed the exploit. That is not permitted under the Assistance and Access Bill.

    And again, I acknowledge that things don't always go to plan, but the inclusion of a technical expert to defend the interests of the compelled organisation, as well as the default 180 day expiration of a TCN, should mean excepting a screw up, the capability requested is removed at the expiration of the notice.

    In other words, you're comparing a vulnerability affecting millions of computers world wide, which might have been found eventually anyway by a criminal group, to an intentionally and selectively placed, then removed capability, which has some pretty extreme limitations on its capabilities. (No interception, no decryption, etc).

    I'm not sure if it's me that doesn't understand this case, or you. Okay, you just described spyware. Let's say that requested capability is leaked in a similar fashion to the NSA Vault 7 event. It's probably got less capability and flexibility than common remote access Trojans you could buy for around $50, or a customised AV evading version for about $3000. Now what? Without the same capability to compel the business to install it for you, you own nothing more than a piece of software anyone can buy for $50.

    So every single person on earth has a copy of it. Every single person with $50 spare could do the same thing. Does one more, perhaps a bit more professionally written, and a little more targeted really matter?

    300K requests, may not be 300k people. Imagine you have someone known to be a "fixated person". First of all, you request his mobile records, his home phone records, his ISP records. That's 3 requests already. From that, you see he has a few email addresses. Let's request meta of that too. 5. Facebook accounts, Skype, Whatsapp messenger. 8. You can see how fast that is expanding. Now, you've determined through his meta, there's at least 10 different people he's communicating on a regular basis, and there's grounds to believe they are involved as well. In the end, 300K requests might only be a few thousand investigations, of which a small portion of which are prosecuted.

    In the above block, I may be confusing the targeted "Telecommunications" provider under the meta data retention laws, and the broader "Communications provider", under the Assistance and Access laws, but you get the point. 1 request doesn't mean 1 person impacted.
     
  11. JSmithDTV

    JSmithDTV Member

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  12. cvidler

    cvidler Member

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    Except they're not.


    So of the four major providers in Germany, they're publicly stating, that they have partnered with another vendor or are moving away from Huawei (and or, demanding independent review of infra).


    Couldn't be assed fact checking your undocumented claims for Holland/Spain/every other Euro country. I'll simply believe anything you say from now on is Chinese state sponsored propaganda.

    Note most western governments have either raised warnings our outright bans against Huawei - but not ZTE (amongst others), there's something to it, not just anti-China.
     
  13. JSmithDTV

    JSmithDTV Member

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    Not sure what you mean mate, your linked article is dated the 25/1 and 31/1, whereas what I posted is from the 17/7...

    https://www.sdxcentral.com/articles/news/german-operators-boast-5g-deployments/2019/07/


    JSmith
     
  14. elvis

    elvis Old school old fool

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    I'll take the time to properly respond to the rest of your points (and thank you for some great discussion too).

    But EternalBlue is an interesting case. No, the NSA did not craft the hole, merely discovered it and leveraged it. However what they didn't do was notify the vendor.

    Now in years gone by, they did. Always. Up until 9/11, the NSA were very proactive in the software security community. Indeed, I spent decades hardening Linux and Windows servers alike to NSA documentation standards, publicly available on their website.

    What the discovery of EternalBlue was, was a slap in the face to any proponent of the NSA. Myself included. And what it did was shake the world's confidence that our once trusted US government partners could be trusted any more. Microsoft on particular were VERY vocal about how wrong they felt it was - something I've literally never heard from the company in its entire existence (and I've used their products in business since pre-Internet).

    The AA Bill is certainly different in technical detail. But I'm looking at something deeper than technical nuts and bolts (which may or may not irk people who want to keep this discussion purely technical). I'm looking at trust.

    I used to trust the NSA. They once helped me, and both the private and public sector orgs I worked for to be BETTER protected. Now that trust is destroyed because of one action.

    Likewise, I used to trust DSD/ASD. Now, along with Home Affairs, all I see is Dutton's blunt instrument.

    Yes, trrrsts are bad. Yes, police work is fucking difficult when you have to follow the rules and the crims don't. Yes, every fucker with a phone is now connected in ways we've never seen before. But no, I don't think actively hostile actions like forcing companies to poke holes in every device is right, purely because it's not like the olden days. A police wire tap on your house didn't leave your banking details open to every person on planet Earth back then. Today, an exploited phone with the details protected by either a low paid support monkey, or worse, a foreign call centre knob, is truly frightening. (Never forget the filing cabinet incident. All it takes is one lapse...)

    I don't know what the answer is. Again, I'm pro-Police, so this doesn't come from some anti-authoritarian place. But I consider myself pretty pragmatic and fairly experienced in matters of technical security, and I'm totally stumped. My gut feel is we need a lot more discussion from experts yet, and not Dutton's current offering.
     
    Last edited: Aug 20, 2019
  15. Sunder

    Sunder Member

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    Edited for clarity:

    I think this might be the difference in our expectations of the law. I don't have time to look it up now, but I thought there was an explicit prohibition against providing any kind of remote access to a device. So while technically, you could make the software change to "phone home" to a law enforcement owned server for new instructions, you could not make the phone remotely accessible to anyone, including yourself. (Meaning the law enforcement agency, not the compelled company)

    I'm assuming your use of "Every" in that sentence is casual, because you have indicated previously that you understood, that every instance of a compulsion must be sought, and any capability increase, must not target anyone who is not explicitly named in the notice. (I.e. if taken literally, if I shared a computer with my wife, they could not insert software onto that shared PC unless my wife was also named on the TCN.
     
    Last edited: Aug 20, 2019
  16. elvis

    elvis Old school old fool

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    My problem are tools like these:

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Odin_(firmware_flashing_software)

    "Secret" tools used by vendors that get leaked. What happens if (or when) whatever secret tool/key/password/gizmo Monsieur Dutton demands to be crafted leaks. Can the vendor patch it, keeping the bad guys out, but making law enforcement go back to square one? Or will they be forced to keep their mouths shut, as per the current AABill?

    Because once said tool is leaked (and again, let's not forget that these devices are all made overseas, and accessed by people easily swayed by relatively small bribes), it doesn't matter who was the first legal access. Because the bad guys can use the tool to screw over anyone else on the same software. And that's where my comparison to EternalBlue comes in to play. No, the NSA didn't intend for millions of computers to get cryptolocker every year. They didn't intend for the world's largest shipping giant to grind to a halt for three weeks costing trillions in long reaching damages and causing worrying product shortages. They just wanted to find some bad guys and protect the world.

    "The road to hell is paved with good intentions", as the saying goes.

    I understand all of your points about the bill itself. I've read the bill several times. But the bill is extremely short sighted to onflow effects we're already seeing elsewhere in the software industry. And yes, I think they are the responsibility of the people writing the bill. To ignore these obvious concerns is bordering on criminal negligence.
     
    Last edited: Aug 20, 2019
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  17. JSmithDTV

    JSmithDTV Member

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    This is a large concern I also have...


    JSmith
     
  18. Sunder

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    I'm still lost on this one. So you get a copy of something like Odin. How do you use it? Steal a device and return it? Won't give you any access to the device.

    Master Keys and Passwords can't be requested.

    Give me something to work with here. Because I'm not seeing anything the AA bill allows that doesn't already exist, and is much easier to get by criminals.

    Edit: Okay, let me explain my stance on this using the legislation directly:

    Fairly straight forward. No back doors, no prevention of patching known weaknesses to create a defacto back door. Anything unclear about that?

    No decryption backdoors. That means no master keys, no turning off of encryption. So all this talk of encryption backdoors is misinformed if not disingenous.

    No setting seeds or nonces to predictable values, no forcing the downgrade to single DES so it can be broken. No resetting of passwords, for forcing them not to salt passwords or use a weaker hashing algorithm, so the agency can easily crack them. Clear enough?

    Right, now we get to the juicy part - What can you do against a single target?

    So, this was my point about my wife and I sharing a PC. If she's not on the list of targeted people on the TCN, my PC is off limits.

    It goes further though:

    So, if I talk to other people on Whatsapp, a TCN requiring Facebook to decrypt all of my communications is not permitted, because it means that an innocent person talking to me, could have their side of the conversation accessed by an unauthorised third party - say their work, school, parent, or even an unrelated ISP.

    So where does that leave the tools you are concerned about? What kind of tool can be created without violating these restrictions that would cause you concern?

    And if you tell me that not all law enforcement agencies are law abiding, first, I'm gonna strangle you, then I'm going to try to explain as patiently as I can, that no only the fact that if they were going to break the law in the first place, creating a law to break doesn't in any way encourage them, and secondly, how are they going to enforce the penalties for non-compliance? Go to a judge and tell them that a company is refusing to comply with their illegal demands? And yes, several people have tried to argue that line with me, which honestly, just shows me the illogical stupidity of people arguing emotionally without thinking their own thoughts through - it can't even be blamed on ignorance, it fails a simple logic test.

    Anyway, you probably weren't going to go there, but just cutting off the aggro before it starts in case you do.
     
    Last edited: Aug 20, 2019
  19. elvis

    elvis Old school old fool

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    OK, so I've used EternalBlue and Odin as examples of when shit goes bad. Please don't get caught up on these specific items. These are not in and of themselves things that can be used right now, today, on phones. What they are, however, are examples of when people do dumb shit. And like I said before, you need to take a step back from reading the AA Bill letter for letter, and start thinking about the human element that the bill intentionally ignores. Get out of the weeds, and take a view from up higher.

    The AA Bill's aim is to "force" (legally) any vendor to provide access to specific communication data outside of encrypted channels.

    So, let's work through this with a hypothetical situation with the AABill of Dutton's dreams in full effect. I have Signal on my phone. It encrypts shit. Snowden-approved! Let's say I'm the words greatest criminal mastermind, doing all sorts of nefarious shit that harms little old ladies. The AFP want to see a conversation or seven I've had for entirely legitimate law enforcement reasons. They do all the right stuff, hit up a judge, get a warrant, the works.

    They go to my ISP/RSP/network-provider. Nada. Everything's encrypted and it's all garbage at their end. Fine. AA Bill at the ready, they hit up my phone vendor and tell them to put this rad bit of code (TM) on the phone that scrapes all the virtual keystrokes.

    Phone vendor uses some side-loading magic bit of vendor software to put on their little keylogger without me knowing and record all my shit. Federales get their man, I go to jail, the world is a safer place. Hooray, Hollywood ending, roll credits.

    But wait - Russian cryptolocker groups catch wind of this. They hustle up some cash they have lying around propping up the wobble table in the corner, hit up the lowest paid numpty employed at said phone manufacturer, and convince them for the insane price of $999 (6 years' salary from where our numpty lives in his still developing nation that we outsourced all our IT to for cheap) to send them a copy of the rad bit of code (TM). Now, OF COURSE numpty is caught, tortured, and his family is set on fire. So once again, hooray for swift justice. But the tool is out there now. What's next?

    Yes, this is a hypothetical example. No, it hasn't happened yet, and may never happen. But EternalBlue was an example of a computer exploit that wasn't plugged (when it could have been) that continues to fuck over millions of people today. Odin is an example of a vendor-developed tool that is used to bypass all and any locally applied restrictions on a device, and got leaked.

    Take the circumstances of EternalBlue, add them to the circumstances of Odin, mix with equal parts AABill, and you've got some real world concerns. What happens if/when this side-loader app and keylogger leaks? Now every knob who was unlucky to have the same phone as me can unknowingly have all their shit scraped.

    Once again, big picture. The whole point of the AABill is to "protect Australians". And yet, the moment these tools leak, Australians become unwilling victims.

    I repeat: I'm not anti the idea of "wire taps" in the 21st century. I just want a guarantee that the tools used stay in police hands, and don't leak to every cryptolocker author. When the police used to tap phones, the tap was physical. It wasn't software that could be duplicated for zero effort. My phone line was physical. It wasn't digitally connected to the Internet and billions of other devices.

    Big picture: we invented encryption to overcome the critical problem of sending private messages in public spaces. We did this long before computers (the history of encryption is fascinating, and dates back to ancient Greece and ancient Rome). Computers make things worse as far as "public spaces" go. So encryption got tougher as a result.

    When you control physical things in limited spaces (safes, phone lines), encryption doesn't matter so much. When you break in to physical things, the effect is localised. But now our communication devices are out in public - literally the biggest public of all, the Internet - planet wide. When we break into these things, we need to make very certain that we aren't exposing them to the entire Internet by accident.

    One could argue that this isn't the AABill's problem. That the vendors supplying the software to comply with the AABill are the ones who need to foot the social and financial responsibilities of keeping their code under lock and key. And to a point, I agree. Again, EternalBlue and Odin were ultimately private company fuckups. The problem is when the law comes around and starts demanding that things be created to weaken a system as a whole (not encryption specifically, but rather a complex set of things that make up a trusted private communication environment necessary for work and life in the 21st century). It's really, really fucking hard making secure software in the public eye with large peer groups to scrutinise your code. What happens when the AABill demands small groups of people write software to aid police work, and they aren't allowed to confer with peers or have their tools reviewed?

    So I say again, there are a lot of unanswered questions here. And while you can tell me to the letter what the AABill does and does not say, I can show you relevant example in neighbouring places where people attempted to use secret methods to invade commodity software running on commodity hardware, it leaked, and all hell broke loose.

    I don't want all hell to break loose in my country. Whether that's bad guys with guns and bombs running around talking to each other on secret channels, or whether that's every iPhone in the country getting mass hacked and everyone's shit getting leaked or digitally stolen. Both of these examples suck, both need to be prevented. So far it feels like the choices are lowering the chance of one by heightening the chance of another, and that sucks too.
     
    Last edited: Aug 20, 2019
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  20. Sunder

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    Okay, looks like we both posted simultaneously, so I'll apply my last post to your latest one.

    All good so far, AA Bill permits this.

    Right. Now this is where it gets juicy. That magic bit? It matters. It's the absolute crux of the problem. You can't gloss over it and claim ignorance on how it is done.

    Right now, there are protections to stop unauthorised third parties, from loading software onto a mobile device without the owner's permission. In the language of the bill an "electronic protection".

    Any tool which is capable of bypassing this "electronic protection" by system, instead of by person, is by definition a systemic weakness and cannot be compelled.

    Good question. If this targeted, but non systemic tool is out there, now the Russian cryptolocker gang needs to figure out how to deliver it to a victim. The interception agency may issue a legal and enforceable TCN to send it only to the target, if it meets all other criteria, does the Russian crime gang have the same powers?


    ooooooii Wot? If people are still being hit by EternalBlue 2.5 years after a patch was released, I don't think you could blame the NSA for this one. In fact, the NSA warned Microsoft of the vulnerability in March 2017, before the auction of the code in May 2017, that's more notice that "responsible disclosure" guidelines recommend.

    And what is it you actually think Odin is capable of? Yes, it can completely overwrite the firmware of a device, such that even a factory reset of the device won't remove spyware. Pretty damn powerful stuff. But if the phone is encrypted, all data is lost in the process, so not only is now your malware useless for historical data (you just destroyed evidence), the person under surveillance probably has a pretty good idea their phone was tampered with. If the phone is not encrypted, then you achieve the same thing without Odin. What's the advantage?

    At this point, not sure it's worth discussing the rest of your post, because it's predicated on false assumptions: Now we know EternalBlue's "fault" was superior to a private sector researcher finding the same vulnerability, let alone a criminal or hostile nation group finding it, that Odin doesn't work the magic you think it does, and even if it did, as long as it was a compliant notification would be useless to Russian gangs... I'll ignore the rest of your post, and ask you, do you disagree with my interpretation of the law? Or are you starting to realise most of this hysteria is based on assumptions that are false? It's also possible that I've missed scenarios you think are possible under the laws, but if there are, please point them out.
     

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